



Compromise not consensus 
Designing a participatory process for landslide risk mitigation 
Anna Scolobig (1,2), Michael Thompson (1), JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer (1) 
1. Risk, Policy and Vulnerability Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
Laxenburg, Austria 
2. Climate Policy Group, Department of Environmental Systems Science, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
(ETH) Zurich, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
With the escalating costs of landslides, the challenge for local authorities is to develop institutional 
arrangements for landslide risk management that are viewed as efficient, feasible and fair by those 
affected. For this purpose, the participation of stakeholders in the decision making process is mandated 
by the European Union as a way of improving its perceived legitimacy and transparency. This paper 
reports on an analytical-deliberative process for selecting landslide risk mitigation measures in the 
town of Nocera Inferiore in southern Italy. The process was structured as a series of meetings with a 
group of selected residents and several parallel activities open to the public. The preparatory work 
included a literature/media review, semi-structured interviews carried out with key local stakeholders 
and a survey eliciting residents’ views on landslide risk management. The main point of departure in 
the design of this process was the explicit elicitation and structuring of multiple worldviews (or 
perspectives) among the participants with respect to the nature of the problem and its solution. Rather 
than eliciting preferences using decision analytical methods (e.g. utility theory or multi-criteria 
evaluation), this process built on a body of research – based on the theory of plural rationality – that 
has teased out the limited number of contending and socially constructed definitions of problem-and-
solution that are able to achieve viability. This framing proved effective in structuring participants’ 
views and arriving at a compromise recommendation (not, as is often aimed for, a consensus) on 
measures for reducing landslide risk. Experts played a unique role in this process by providing a range 
of policy options that corresponded to the different perspectives held by the participants. 
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Nocera Inferiore in the Campania region of southern Italy is exposed to multiple natural 
hazards, including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods and landslides. On 4 March 2005 
the highest risk area of the town, the Monte Albino slope, experienced a landslide that caused 
three deaths and extensive property damage. Three years later, a €24.5 million risk mitigation 
project prepared by the Regional Emergency Commissariat was rejected by the Municipal 
Council supported by many citizens and local associations. Six years after that, in 2011, 
decisions about risk mitigation in Monte Albino were still pending. 
This policy stalemate shows how the lack of public support can be a barrier for landslide risk 
mitigation, and highlights the need for public involvement in the policy process. Landslide 
policy in Europe, and elsewhere, has traditionally been the domain of experts working in 
tandem with public authorities and has therefore been framed as a technical and economic 
rather than a social issue. This is now changing, with participatory approaches increasingly 
acknowledged as the way to integrate risk management into community planning by 
considering disasters as “community-based problems requiring community based solutions” 
(Schneider 2002: 143; also Mileti 1999; Pearce 2003; Tan et al. 2012). However, the role of 
technical and economic expertise, though changed, is not diminished. Nor is this changed role 
particularly new; as early as 1996, the US National Research Council was recommending the 
addition of an analytical-deliberative process that combines stakeholder dialogue and expert 
analysis for the purpose of enhancing the science-policy interface in risk management (Stern 
and Fineberg 1996): a dramatic switch that was matched in Britain, in 1997, by the Royal 
Society’s “growing consensus” that public perceptions should be included in the assessment 
of risk (see Thompson and Rayner 1998). 
This paper reports on the design and implementation of a two-year participatory process that 
engaged citizens and experts in the co-production of landslide risk mitigation options for 
Nocera Inferiore, and resulted in a compromise recommendation. The distinctive point of 
departure for this project is the explicit elicitation and structuring, building on the theory of 
plural rationality, of multiple worldviews (or perspectives) on the nature of the problem and 
its solution (Thompson et al 1990; Thompson 2008)1. Rather than eliciting preferences using 
decision analytical methods (e.g. utility theory or multi-criteria evaluation), this process draws 
                                                
1 The theory has sailed under a number of names: originally “cultural theory” (which unfortunately risks giving 
the impression that it is culture that is doing the explaining); more recently “neo-Durkheimian institutional 
theory” (which, while correct, is too much of a mouthful). 
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on research that has demonstrated a limited number of socially constructed views of nature 
and which has proved effective in grouping participants in participatory processes and thereby 
arriving at clumsy solutions: outcomes, initially “hidden” from all the participants, that enjoy 
a much higher level of overall consent than any of those in which just one set of actors 
manages to impose hegemony and “go it alone”.  Clumsy solutions thus stand in marked 
contrast to the more familiar elegant solutions which, having been tailored to just one 
perspective, are exclusive of the others. The pre-requisite for a clumsy solution, it follows, are 
accessibility (each voice able to make itself heard) and responsiveness (each voice engaged 
with, rather than dismissive of the others). Indeed it quite often turns out, with a clumsy 
solution, that each actor ends up with more of what it wants (and less of what it doesn’t want) 
than it would have got if it had managed to impose its preferred and elegant solution (see 
Thompson and Beck 2015 for three case studies in which this somewhat counter-intuitive 
outcome is demonstrated).2 
The discussion begins, in Section 2, with a short history and characterization of landslide risk 
and risk mitigation policy in Nocera Inferiore before turning, in Section 3, to a brief 
motivating discussion on public participation in landslide risk policy. Section 4 sets out the 
conceptual framing – compromise rather than consensus – thereby foregrounding the 
contested terrain, with its plurality of deeply-held and mutually irreducible worldviews (or 
perspectives), that forms the basis for the design of the participatory process. Section 5 
explains the process itself: the preliminary research and then the five meetings by means of 
which the participants and the experts, through a process of co-production, were able to find 
their way to a compromise: a clumsy solution. Finally, a discussion of what has been achieved 
is provided in Section 6.  
 
                                                
2 These voices emanate from the theory of plural rationality’s typology of four forms of social solidarity: 
hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism, as they are called (for example, Douglas 1978; Thompson 
2008; Ney 2009). A brief explanation of the theory itself can be found in Linnerooth-Bayer et al. (this issue). For 
a mapping of the similarities and differences between clumsy solutions and other proposed ways of coping with 
this sort of plurality-“bounded rationality” (Simon 1947), see for instance, “muddling through” (Lindblom 
1959), the “garbage can” (March and Olsen 1976), “mixed scanning” (Etzioni 1968), “iteractive mixed 
scanning” (Gershuny 1978), “optimal rational decision-making” (Dror 1968). This mapping also holds for the 
more recent “sanguine compromise” (Margalit 2014), see Schwarz and Thompson (1990, especially chapter 
4:”Beyond the politics of interest). 
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2 Landslide risk mitigation in Nocera Inferiore 
Almost ten percent of the 46 thousand residents of Nocera Inferiore, it has been estimated, are 
at risk from landslides (Italian National Institute of Statistics 2001). On 4 March 2005, 
following 150 mm of rainfall in just 24 hours (Pagano 2009), a landslide caused the deaths of 
three people when their house was destroyed by the impact of the soil mass. Several other 
houses were destroyed or damaged, and over 1,350 people were evacuated from the area 
(Ordinanza n. 8822, 2005). Apart from some urgent measures to stabilize the slope 
immediately following the event, there were no further interventions before our fieldwork 
began in 2010. In the aftermath of that event, however, many issues emerged on the political 
agenda, particularly reimbursement to the victims (as required by Italian law) and the 
reduction of future landslide risk. To facilitate stakeholder involvement, the municipal 
authorities created a forum on landslide risk management (involving residents, local 
associations and public agencies) and a fund that was earmarked for the reimbursement of the 
families and for risk mitigation actions. However, at the time this research project was started 
– approximately five years later – no reimbursements had been made3. 
In November 2008, the primary authority for allocating resources for risk mitigation and 
victim compensation, the Emergency Commissariat, together with the regional Civil 
Protective Agency, initiated a project for reducing the risk of landslide to residents of Monte 
Albino (this being in addition to the urgent measures taken immediately after the 2005 event). 
The total budget for this project, which included structural measures such as water tanks and 
storage basins (resoconto della seduta consiliare del 22 aprile 2008) was €24.5 million. The 
municipal authorities, supported by citizens and local associations, then refused to endorse 
this proposal. This was for several reasons, the most important being that the project’s costs 
were not fully covered by regional funds. In addition, certain technical weaknesses were 
identified, together with the hitherto unaddressed question of how to prioritize the various risk 
mitigation measures. How (and, indeed, whether) to renovate the hydraulic network was one 
stumbling-block; another was the failure to adequately consider investments in non-structural 
and environmentally friendly measures. 
 In the wake of this rejection, two Emergency Commissioners were appointed in quick 
succession and partial responsibility for risk mitigation was devolved from the regional Soil 
                                                
3 A letter from the municipal councilor responsible stated: “The funds have not been distributed because of the 
delays and oversights on the part of the regional Civil Protection. In the years that followed the emergency, the 
National Civil Protection did not renew the state of emergency requested for the entire territory of the Campania 
region. As a result, the available funds were never used” (Prot. 300 IESA, 2010). 
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Defense Agency to the local municipal authorities (Scolobig et al. 2011). The latter then 
contracted external experts and consultants to prepare a risk reduction strategy based on the 
previously somewhat disregarded “softer” measures, such as maintenance/remediation of the 
slope and naturalistic engineering works (channel lining, for instance, and vegetated gabions 
aimed at reducing erosion due to frequent rainfall events). In 2010, this proposed plan was 
approved by the Conference of the Services: a conference, organized by the municipal 
technical offices, to discuss and approve an administrative act, decision or project. A private 
consultant was then asked by the municipality to present a preliminary project, based on a risk 
assessment study and taking into account a budget of €1.4 million for its implementation. This 
project was then approved by the local authorities in September 2010. Later that year, 
following the appointment of the second Emergency Commissioner, the earmarked sum to set 
up a risk mitigation plan was increased to €7 million. The project had still not been 
implemented when the fieldwork reported in this paper ended in 2011. 
 
3 Public participation in landslide risk management 
In 2010, when the fieldwork for this research started, the municipal authorities were eager to 
involve the citizens of Nocera Inferiore in preparing a plan for allocating the €7 million for 
mitigating landslide risk. Their interest in participation was partly motivated by the recent 
public opposition to the plan prepared by the Regional Civil Protection. The River Basin 
Authorities were interested because of the implementation of the newly-issued European 
Union Water Framework Directive (WFD) (2000/60/EC), which calls for extensive citizen 
participation in river basin planning issues. Curiously, despite the many calls for public 
participation in environmental issues over the preceding two decades, there were, at that time, 
no documented procedures for actually doing it in relation to landslide risk management. 
However, it seems likely that the exhortations set out in the Rio Declaration (UNCED 1992), 
in the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR 2005) and in the European Floods Directive 
(European Parliament 2007) – which states that “Member States shall encourage active 
involvement of interested parties in the production, review and updating of the flood 
management plans ...” (Art. 14) – may be extended to landslide risks.  
Moreover, public participation has now become a significant theme in the scientific 
discussion on natural hazards in Europe, even though there are, as yet, few empirical 
examples (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2006; Messner et al. 2006; Junker et al. 2007) as compared 
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with the literature on environmental risks and water management (e.g. Aldred and Jacobs 
2000; Kallis et al. 2009; Paneque Salgado et al. 2009; Jackson et al. 2012). At the same time, 
the legislative emphasis in the European Union, and elsewhere, on public participation 
responds to the increasing demands for more transparency and fairness in risk management 
institutions and procedures (Renn 2008; Rowe et al. 2004; Webler et al. 1995; Webler et al. 
2001). Experience has shown that the involvement of stakeholders can increase public 
awareness, take account of local concerns, bring new options to light, delineate the space for 
agreement or compromise and, not least, enhance the credibility of public risk management 
institutions. A participatory process, moreover, can help policy-makers understand 
stakeholder needs and expectations, and enhance consent by sharing responsibility for the 
decisions taken (Dryzek 2001; Elster 1998; Steiner 2012; Dietz 2013; Fischoff 2013). 
Despite these benefits, experience has also shown that public participation is not a panacea. 
Without careful design and management, participatory processes can lead to inefficiencies in 
the outcomes, stabilise existing and often dysfunctional power distributions, and make 
ignorance and incompetence the guiding principles for decision making. They can also 
prolong decision making and immobilise institutions (for problems in deliberation see e.g. 
Parkinson 2006; Ryfe 2005; Rosenberg 2007; van Eaten 2001; Wynne 2007). Particularly 
problematic in the Nocera Inferiore case was the bounding of the breadth of participation, not 
only with respect to the number and demographic characteristics of the participants, but also 
with regard to their knowledge, values, worldviews and standing in the community. Since 
participation must inevitably be limited to a manageable number of participants (in this case, 
16) and thus not fully representative of the community, establishing process legitimacy for 
both non-participants and policy-makers is far from straightforward. An especially thorny 
issue (discussed in detail in Linnerooth-Bayer et al. this volume) is how best to include 
experts and communicate their technical information (which itself cannot be assumed to be 
value-free) to the participants (Rowe and Frewer 2000). Further challenges relate to the 
design of the process itself, including how to set and reach objectives through facilitation and 
other methods. 
In short, simply calling for public participation is not enough. Indeed, in the absence of a 
carefully designed and tested process, it may simply end up compromising the objective of 
efficient and effective risk reduction while, at the same time, violating the principles of 
fairness that are held by some of the participants, thereby sapping consent and eroding 
democracy. Participatory processes, moreover, need to be able to combine technical expertise 
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with the deliberation between the holders of often disparate values and preferences. The key-
words, unsurprisingly, have become: trust-building, community development and co-
determination (Renn 1998, 2006, 2008). But, and this is the crucial question addressed in this 
paper, how might these desiderata be achieved: through consensus or through compromise? 
The latter, we will argue. 
 
4 The case for compromise (and for contested terrains and clumsy solutions) 
We can begin with the important distinction between contested terrains and uncontested 
terrains (Thompson and Ellis 1997). With contested terrains (climate change is currently the 
prime example) there are contending and mutually irreconcilable definitions of what both the 
problem and the solution are, and these do not converge as the policy process proceeds 
(Thompson and Gyawali 2007). With uncontested terrains (the hole in the ozone layer, for 
instance) there is a single, agreed definition of the problem and of its solution, and if there is 
some initial plurality it soon converges to singularity once the policy process gets under way. 
Proponents of compromise would argue that it is only in the case of those latter – uncontested 
terrains that happen to display some initial plurality – that consensus is possible. In the case of 
contested terrains, they would further argue, singularity can only be achieved by the 
imposition of one definition of problem-and-solution and the exclusion of the others. And that 
is not consensus; it is hegemony! 
So, if we want to avoid imposing hegemony when our intention is to achieve consensus, we 
will need to know whether the terrain we are dealing with is contested or uncontested4. 
Proponents of consensus, however, though they identify certain “conditions for authentic 
dialogue” (Innes 2004: 5), do not explicitly draw that crucial distinction. Participatory 
processes, they hold, if grounded on consensus-building, can and should lead to a 
transformation of citizens’ preferences. This is accomplished, the argument continues, by 
persuasion, rather than by coercion, manipulation or deception (Dryzek 2001; van den Hove 
2006). “Yes”, reply the proponents of compromise, “but only if the problem is an uncontested 
one (in which case it would move towards singularity of its own accord, anyway)”. So it is as 
simple, and as stark, as that. 
                                                
4 This distinction, we should mention, has also been cast in terms of wicked problems (where the terrain is 
contested) and tame problems (where the terrain is uncontested) with the seven distinctive characteristics of 
wicked problems clearly revealing that climate change is wicked/contested and the ozone hole tame/uncontested 
(Rittel and Webber 1973; Verweij et al 2011; Rayner 2014). In other words, these two distinctions – one 
originating in social anthropology, the other in planning/public administration – are interchangeable. 
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• Outcomes, in the consensus paradigm, are legitimated if they lead to a rationally 
motivated convergence, with participants striving to apprehend a common interest. In 
this way, an “optimal” solution, even if provisional, can be found for every 
controversy.  This concept of consensus applies primarily to the rational search for 
universal norms (e.g. Habermas 1983, 1996) and it forms the backbone of 
“communicative rationality/discursive ethics”, according to which a convergent 
outcome should result if certain theoretical conditions (e.g. an “ideal speech 
situation”) are fulfilled and communicative action, rather than individual strategizing 
behaviour, is applied (Habermas 1983). However, “consensus building” and 
“communicative rationality”, though they have much in common, are far from 
identical. “Consensus building”, as Innes is at pains to stress, “grew up as a practice 
without knowledge of or reference to Habermas” – the originator of the notion of 
communicative rationality – who, she points out, “is a social theorist not an empirical 
researcher” (Innes 2004: 10; emphasis in the original). While the force of the better 
argument is the key concept in communicative rationality, it is the exploration of all 
interests, along with efforts to satisfy these different concerns, that are crucial for the 
proponents of consensus building (Susskind et al 1999, 2002). Even so, Innes 
concedes that Habermas “offers much” to the consensus building enterprise.  
• According to the compromise paradigm, however, a consensus can be achieved only if 
the terrain happens to be uncontested. In all other instances, attempting to transform 
preferences and values through communication and argumentation – that is, by 
treating a contested terrain as if it was uncontested – will inevitably result in outcomes 
that are far from optimal: pessimal, in fact, since they will satisfy just one set of 
“definition-holders” and reject the rest. True, participants in public fora may 
sometimes change their preferences in the course of their deliberations, but that 
change often (always, perhaps) reverses when they return to their institutional and 
social contexts. The reason is that individual preferences, far from being inherent (like 
a person’s fingerprints), are deeply rooted in patterns of social interactions; we are, in 
Jon Elster’s memorable phrase “inherently relational” (Elster 1985: 6). 
Devotees of Kenneth Grahame’s The Wind in the Willows will recall how the boastful 
and over-bearing Toad, when reproached by his fellow creatures of the riverbank for 
reneging on his promise to change his ways – made when they had all been gathered 
in Toad Hall – replied “O, yes, yes, in there” (Grahame 1908: 76). And, if we go on to 
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quote Toad more fully, we begin to see some of the perils in trusting in persuasion and 
de-contextualized deliberation as a way of changing interests and values. 
I’d have said anything in there. You’re so eloquent, dear Badger, and so 
moving, and so convincing, and put all your points so frightfully well – you 
can do what you like with me in there, and you know it. But I’ve been 
searching my mind since, and going over things in it, and I find that I’m not a 
bit sorry or repentant really, so it’s no earthly good saying I am; now is it? 
(Grahame 1908: p. 76-77). 
And this Toad-like tendency for transformed values and preferences to revert has led some 
authors (e.g. Rescher 1995; De Marchi 2003; Stirling 2006; van den Hove 2006) to argue that 
consensus-seeking is neither desirable nor sustainable for reaching a policy recommendation. 
Now, with these two paradigms clarified, together with the making explicit of the crucial 
distinction between contested and uncontested terrains, we can turn to the normative 
reasoning that has been developed from the consensus paradigm, and to the difficulties that it 
has run into. Difficulties so profound, we will argue, as to progressively shift it ever closer to 
its rival: the compromise paradigm. 
• Communication, according to Habermas, allows disputants to incorporate their 
opponents’ interpretations of the conflict into their own, in such a way that “the 
divergent situation definitions can be brought to coincide sufficiently” (Habermas 
1983: 100). Indeed, consensus building practitioners set out to resolve conflicts by 
creating new areas of understanding and by establishing a new and common language 
among the initially opposed actors. “Fine”, proponents of compromise would say, “but 
only so long as the terrain is uncontested”. But proponents of consensus, ignoring that 
proviso, go on to argue that clashes and disputes can be avoided, and differences 
reconciled and embraced in spite of their depth, in a unifying dialogue (Peterson et al. 
2005). But if these differences are indeed “deep”, proponents of compromise would 
point out, then that indicates that we are probably dealing with a contested terrain, in 
which case the “new and common language” will be working its magic, not by 
unifying, but by excluding. 
• Susskind et al. (1999: 6) , backing off a little, define consensus-building as follows:  
“... a process of seeking unanimous agreement. It involves a good-faith 
effort to meet the interests of all stakeholders. Consensus has been reached 
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when everyone agrees they can live with whatever is proposed after every 
effort has been made to meet the interests of all stakeholder parties.” 
Here, proponents of compromise would point out, consensus has not actually 
happened – the interests of the stakeholders remain unconverged – and the outcome 
looks more like what they call a “clumsy solution” than a meeting of minds by way of 
a unifying dialogue.  
• Innes (2004: 7) similarly breaks ranks by setting out a list of conditions that will have 
to be satisfied if a process is to be labelled “consensus-building”: a full range of 
stakeholders, a task that is meaningful to the participants and promises a timely 
impact, participants making their own ground rules (for agenda-setting, behaviour and 
so on), a process that ensures a mutual understanding of interests and avoids positional 
bargaining, a dialogue where all are heard and respected, and so on. Again, we see the 
divergent interests “understood” and “respected” but not converged. Similarly, we can 
expect those stakeholders (if they genuinely encompass the “full range”, that is) to 
have different ideas of what is a “timely impact” (and also of what sort of task is 
“meaningful”) and of how the agenda should be set, and also to be prone to sneaking 
in some of that “positional bargaining” while no one is looking. Indeed, taken 
together, these conditions, proponents of compromise would point out, ensure not 
consensus but the “accessibility” and “responsiveness” that (as we have already 
mentioned) are the pre-requisites for clumsy solutions. 
Increasingly, it becomes apparent, the proponents of consensus, like those creatures of the 
riverbank trying to get Toad to change his ways, have set themselves an impossible task (at 
least when it comes to contested terrains, and most terrains these days - largely as a result of 
the massive increase in the reach of governments (Ney 2009) - are contested). Social actors, 
we are told, apprehend a common goal, set their antagonistic differences aside, and adopt a 
collective and interactive mode of cooperation in order to reach a shared and common 
objective (except, of course, when they don’t). The plurality of standpoints and their 
accompanying conflicts, it is asserted (Habermas 1983, 1996), are overcome but not directly 
dealt with, actors do not walk off in different directions but follow a new and common path, 
and all participants find their way to a fresh option that they all value more than the ones they 
variously preferred when they first entered the deliberation (except, of course, when, like 
Toad, they don’t). Participants, we are assured should be drawn by the search for the common 
good, be it through the consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech (Habermas 1983, 
1996) or through interest-based negotiation and mediation (Susskind et al. 1999; Innes 2004).  
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But if, like Toad, they don’t do as they are told, we are left without any consensus. All of 
which raises two questions: how do we cope with that, and could it be that this lack of 
consensus is all to the good? After all, if the plurality was rendered singular we would no 
longer be able to find our way to clumsy solutions! 
Unsurprisingly, some authors, realizing that this is their predicament, have argued that 
consensus and plural rationalities are not mutually exclusive concepts: that they can co-exist 
by operating at different levels, or along different dimensions. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006), 
for instance, hold that plurality at the “simple level” (opposed values, beliefs and preferences 
down there among the grassroots) does not mean that consensus cannot be attained at the 
“meta-level” (a detached viewpoint, high above the fray, where it is possible to acknowledge 
that plurality without feeling obliged to join in and take sides). “Well yes”, say the proponents 
of compromise, “but if you do that you have shifted yourself across to the other paradigm!” 
 Indeed, Innes tacitly acknowledges this when she cautions that consensus-building, far from 
being a one-size-fits-all solution, “is only appropriate in situations of uncertainty and 
controversy where all stakeholders have incentives to come to the table and mutual 
reciprocity in their interests.” So it is inapplicable in these situations characterized (a) not just 
by uncertainty, but by contradictory certainties and b) by the absence of mutual reciprocity in 
their interests. In other words, it is appropriate for tame problems and inappropriate for 
wicked ones. 
In sum, whenever there is a plurality of mutually irreducible definitions of problem-and-
solution and where those definitions, far from converging as the policy process gets 
underway, reinforce one another, we are faced with a contested terrain. The socially 
constructed “contradictory certainties” that constitute this contested terrain are usually  
contained within the wide uncertainties that are so typical of those terrains; they do not 
require that water should flow uphill or that the laws of thermodynamics be re-written (for a 
salutary instance of a contradictory certainty straying beyond those bounds – the once-
influential and now discredited theory of Himalayan environmental degradation – see Ives 
2004; Thompson and Gyawali 2007).  
Since each of these sets of contradictory certainties is all the time defining and refining itself 
in contradistinction to the others (each one’s solution being, in large part, the others’ 
problems), consensus – getting from plurality to singularity – can only be achieved through 
hegemony: pushing one “voice” to the point where it silences the others. So Habermasian 
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consensus – where all the voices come together through a process of deliberation – is a non-
starter. That, at any rate and as we have argued, is the reasoning behind the compromise 
paradigm. But this is not a negative verdict, because the contested terrain, precisely because 
of all the contradiction it contains, is, when it comes to policy design, a valuable resource. 
None of the certainties is wrong (provided, that is, that it remains within the afore-mentioned 
uncertainty bounds); each, rather, is providing a distillation of wisdom and experience that is 
missed by the others. And we would not want to discard most of that by plumping for just one 
of them (which, if you think about it, is what happens with a consensus). On top of that, since 
each of these contending voices is providing a clear statement of how a sizeable portion of the 
populace feels we should live with one another and with nature, it is important (if we value 
democracy, that is) that none of them be excluded from the policy process. Compromises that 
are arrived at by respecting and responding to all the contradictory certainties, and by striving 
to give those who are gathered at each of those “rallying points” on the contested terrain more 
of what they want (and less of what they do not want) – clumsy solutions, that is – can 
maximise organizational learning, husband consent, and avoid technological lock-ins by 
guiding us towards “non-foreclosing options” (Beck et al. 2013). 
In all the instances of clumsy solutions that have been identified so far – the handling of 
radioactive materials in hospitals (Rayner 1986), for instance, rat-infested slums transformed 
into Glorious Heritage (Thompson 1979), pension reform in Europe (Ney 2009), “goods 
only” ropeways in Nepal (Thompson 2013) and Arsenal Football Club’s new stadium 
(Thompson 2008) – these positive features are clearly discernible. However, all those clumsy 
solutions were arrived at by accident, usually as a result of some serendipitous event enabling 
excluded voices to force their way into an insufficiently pluralized policy arena. The 
challenge, therefore, is to get clumsy solutions to happen by design. And that is precisely what 
our participatory process has set out to achieve in Nocera Inferiore. 
 
5 The design of the participatory process 
The full design of the process required three components: the eliciting of the plurality of 
public voices, the implementation of an analytical/deliberative engagement aimed at reaching 
a compromise (i.e. a clumsy solution), and a set of “outreach activities”, by which those who 
were not themselves participants in the formal process were kept informed and enabled to 
make their contributions. While much of the detail of this participatory process – in particular, 
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the elicitation of the three “narratives”, and the co-generation (with the experts) of the three 
“mitigation packages” appropriate to those narratives – is already set out in the paper “Expert 
engagement in participatory processes: Translating shareholder discourses into policy 
options” (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. this volume) our aim here is to clarify not the process itself 
but its design.  
Our aim, in other words, is to go beneath the specifics of Nocera Inferiore and to tease out the 
design principles inherent in the process itself: principles that should then hold, not just for 
landslides, and not just for Nocera Inferiore, but for natural hazards of all kinds, everywhere. 
Such principles, extracted from this specific instance of public participation that has evidently 
been successful, could then be drawn on in relation to hazard management planning in 
general. The effective combining of stakeholder dialogues and expert analysis, as we have 
already seen, has been called for (increasingly) over the past couple of decades. Moreover, it 
is now becoming mandatory, in the European Union, across many classes of natural hazard. 
And, if such processes are to be mandatory, it is vital that they be effective. 
With the first two components – eliciting the public voices and implementing their 
engagement – there is much in the way of generalized design, and we will be devoting 
considerable space to them. But with the third component – the outreach activities – this is not 
really the case, beyond the general stipulation that there should be some reaching-out. So we 
will deal with that first. 
5.1 The outreach activities 
Throughout the process, there was a range of activities that were aimed at providing 
information to, and soliciting concerns and views from, those on the outside of the formal 
proceedings (which, as we will explain, become too cumbersome beyond a limited number of 
participants). Most notably, one website and an on-line group were created featuring as on-
line discussion forums (http://safeland.iiasa.ac.at/index.php/Main_Page; 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/mitigazionedelrischiodafrana/). As well as the upload of 
the documents related to the participatory process (e.g. power point presentations, agendas 
and minutes of the meetings, etc.), questions due to be considered in each of the public 
stakeholder meetings were posted on the website, and residents and officials on the “outside” 
were able to post their comments and opinions, which could then be inputted to the formal 
proceedings. In addition, eight informal parallel meetings were held with the local authorities, 
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voluntary associations working on natural disasters and community leaders to inform them 
about the process. 
 
Also (and this could well be a general feature of public participation processes) the Nocera 
Inferiore case attracted considerable media attention as well as interest from local NGOs, 
students and citizens. For example thanks to the help of students, three videos were prepared 
on the process. In addition, thanks to further support from local municipal councilors, press 
releases, two television interviews, three radio programmes and 15 articles in the local and 
national press were generated. Lastly a simulation exercise was prepared and conducted with 
more than forty doctoral students in the context of an International Summer School organised 
by the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Salerno. 
 
These outreach activities had an actual impact on the participatory process, especially inputs 
received via email and the Facebook group, sometimes critical comments, were taken into 
account in the preparation of the meetings. Moreover members of local NGOs organized 
dissemination activities independently from the process, and the key results of the 
participatory process have been presented at several meetings (e.g. Legambiente, Engineering 
association, University).  The Facebook group, in particular, has been particularly active and 
continues to provide an open forum for discussion on risk mitigation issues.  
 
5.2 Eliciting the public voices 
The desk study, together with the 43 semi-structured interviews, revealed a range of views on 
landslide risk, with the markedly different “certainties” as to what both the problem and the 
solution are, revealing the existence of a contested terrain. This then provided the basis for a 
public questionnaire which, after its piloting, was administered (online and through a local 
association) to the public and resulted in 373 responses. The aim of the questionnaire was to 
obtain a representative sample of views on the different options for reducing landslide risk: 
through, for example, structural and non-structural measures, warning systems and emergency 
response plans. Table 1 summarises the research phases, including methods and tools used to 
elicit stakeholders perspectives. 
Table 1 Research phases, methods and tools 
Phase Main aim Methods and tools 
Case study analysis Describe and understand the case Literature review and desk study 
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study Semi structured interviews (43) 
Focus groups (2) 
Participant observation (6 months) 
Questionnaire survey Collect data about residents’ opinions 
and attitudes regarding landslide risk, 
risk mitigation, risk management and 
emergency planning 
Questionnaire piloting (20) 
Self-administered questionnaires (373) 
collected by local association volunteers 
(351) and online (22) 
Participatory process Promote useful dialogue and 
deliberation among participants with 
the intent of identifying sustainable 
risk mitigation strategies 
 
Public open meeting 
Meetings (5) with selected residents (16) 
Evaluation and feedback about the process 
through questionnaires  
Informal  meetings with local authorities and 
community leaders (8) 
Parallel meetings in working groups 




Facilitate communication and 
information sharing ; legitimise the 
process in front of a wider public 
Website 
Online discussion group  
Videos to promote the participatory process 
(3) 
Press releases, contacts with local media (2 
TV interviews, participation in 3 radio 
programmes,  15 newspaper articles of local 
and national relevance) 
Simulation exercise with students 
Continuous contacts with local authorities 
 
On the basis of the results from the questionnaire, the desk study and the interviews, and 
drawing on the theory of plural rationality, three characteristic discourses were constructed. 
Discourses are interpreted here as shared, structured ways of speaking, thinking, interpreting, 
conveying and logically connecting ideas (Potter 1996; Gee 2010). Before presenting the 
discourses, we should stress that the methodology of discourse analysis does not provide a 
“truth”, but rather a situated reading of a certain topic or problem. Discourse analysis does not 
consider any accounts derived from the interviews to be true or false descriptions of “reality”, but 
investigates how different ways of describing the environment, the society, or events are produced 
within discourses. Keeping this in mind, we first analyzed the transcripts of the interviews and 
identified recurrent themes and ideas, with a focus also on how interviewees connected one idea 
to another. This was the basis for the draft discourses that were subsequently presented during the 
participatory process in order to ask participants for a “reality check”, and for feed-back on how 
the discourses represented (and did not represent) their views (more information in Linnerooth-




• The safety first discourse is more hierarchical than the others, in that it emphasizes the 
importance of expert-driven safety: in this case, in the form of top-down passive 
mitigation measures. Far wiser, those who take this view hold, to provide protection 
before lives and property are lost than to spend possibly greater sums on compensating 
victims once disaster has struck. Protection, however, does not automatically mean 
large, unsightly and expensive concrete structural measures; the job can be done with 
a careful mix of active measures, such as cleaning out drainage ditches and properly 
managing forests. Even so, limited passive measures, such as decanting structures and 
storage basins, will be necessary. Trust in government, and in expert knowledge, is a 
prerequisite in this worldview. 
• The second discourse – careful stewardship of the mountain – is more egalitarian, with 
its emphasis on active and naturalistic engineering measures, and on the equitable 
sharing of risk. It is largely due to unsustainable human interventions – road-building, 
for instance, and industrial activities – that Mount Albino has become subject to 
dangerous landslides, and climate change can only worsen the situation. If residents 
are to be protected the natural cycles and the evolving mountain terrain will have to be 
respected. Since expensive passive structural measures (with just a few exceptions) do 
not do that, they will only aggravate the problems. Instead, we need to take a more 
holistic and ecological view of the mountain and its maintenance. 
• The third discourse – rational choice – is more individualistic, in that it emphasizes 
trade-offs and the right of individuals to decide for themselves. Since landslide risk is 
not the only concern of the residents, and probably not the main one, it is important 
that scarce public resources are allocated across the spectrum of competing projects. 
And to do that you will have to calculate the costs and the benefits to the residents. 
Relocating those few householders who are most at risk, for instance, will likely be 
much more cost effective than across-the-board mitigation measures. 
 
While it is difficult to deny a certain validity in this rational choice line of argument, 
its economistic framing does not fit comfortably into the other two discourses. Indeed, 
for each of them, it constitutes uncomfortable knowledge: knowledge that will have to 
be marginalized in some way – by “barring” it, for instance, or “adjusting” it – if the 
discourse itself is not to be rendered incoherent. And the same, of course, holds for 
each of the other two discourses. Hence the mantra “wicked problems, uncomfortable 
knowledge, clumsy solutions” that helps us treat a contested terrain as something very 
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different from the more familiar uncontested terrain (for uncomfortable knowledge see 
Bloor 1982, for the different ways of marginalizing it and thereby preserving the 
coherence of the discourse/paradigm see Lakatos 1976, and for the mantra itself see 
Beck and Thompson 2015). 
 
A figure showing the locations of these three discourses within the plural rationality framing, 
a brief explanation of the theory itself, and especially a longer and more detailed version of 
the discourses, including interviews´ excerpts, can be found in Linnerooth-Bayer et al. (this 
volume). More interview excerpts, and information on the process of identification of 
recurrent themes and topics are reported in Scolobig et al. (2011, page 90-101; 173-185). The 
questionnaire and its results are set out in Scolobig et al. (this volume) and in Scolobig et al. 
(2011). The discourses have also been validated in several phases of the participatory process. 
For instance at the beginning and at the end we asked participants whether the discourses 
represented their views, we collected their feedback on how to improve the discourse 
description in order to represent local views in the best possible way, and we then included 
these findings in a new version of the discourses. 
 
5.3 Implementing the analytical/deliberative engagement 
With these three discourses encompassing the requisite variety (all the “active” voices, that is, 
the fatalistic discourse – “Nothing we could do would make any difference” – tends to 
distance itself from active participation) we could move on to the second component. This 
was the design and implementation of a process that would combine public participation and 
expert input in order to seek out a compromise: a clumsy solution. This, as we have already 
argued, is in marked contrast to an elegant solution, which is what you get with a participatory 
process that, in somehow eliminating the contested terrain, arrives at what looks like a 
consensus. 
We say “looks like”, because consensus, we have argued, is a valid goal only when there is no 
contested terrain. But if the terrain is contested then consensus can be achieved only by one of 
the contradictory certainties marginalizing the uncomfortable knowledge that is inherent in 
the others. And that hegemonic outcome is invalid, since it imposes just one definition of 
problem-and-solution on a set of equally legitimate and mutually irreducible certainties that 
together constitute the contested terrain. Hence the “requisite variety condition” (see Ashby 
1968; Thompson et al 1990).  
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The process was initiated with a public meeting attended by over 100 residents and officials, 
who were informed about the SafeLand project and, more specifically, about the plans for a 
public participatory process that would make recommendations on landslide risk management 
to the municipal and regional authorities. At this meeting, anyone wishing to participate in 
this process was asked to submit an application and, from those 16 participants were selected. 
Table 2 shows how the applicants were distributed in terms of gender, education, age, 
profession, risk exposure (aiming at half of participants living in the most endangered areas) 
and opinions about risk mitigation. The latter were important in assuring that the three main 
discourses (or voices) revealed initially from the interviews and desk study, were represented 
in the deliberative forum. 
Table 2 Characteristics of the selected residents 
Variables Distribution 
Gender 56.2% male, 43.8% female 
Educational qualification Low (31.2%), medium (37.4%), high (321.2%) 
Age 15-30 (25%), 31-45 (25%), 46-55 (31.2%), 56-75 (18.8%) 
Profession Entrepreneur (18.8%), trader (6.2%), teacher (18.8%), worker (6.2%), 
housewife (6.2%), unemployed (6.2%), retired (18.8%), student (18.8%) 
Risk exposure Yes – living in Monte Albino (43.8%), No – 56.2%) 
Risk mitigation priorities* New protection works (25%), better territory management (23%), cost-benefit 
analysis (25%), other (25%) 
* Elicited by the question (parentheses added): Which of the following statements best reflects your 
opinion? 
• It is a priority to build new structural measures for risk mitigation (Safety First). 
• It is a priority to guarantee better territorial management and the sustainable development of the 
entire area (Careful Stewardship). 
• It is a priority to calculate the costs of risk mitigation and to compare them to the benefits, while 
also taking into account other risks and priorities (Rational Choice). 
• There is nothing to do; landslides will always happen (Fatalism). 
• Other (Specify) 
 
 
The participatory meetings (there were five in all; one more than anticipated) were facilitated 
by the researchers, and consisted of working groups, expert presentations and consultations. 
During the process, several parallel meetings were organized; for example, with the working 
group leaders, to discuss a compromise proposal and collect their feedback. Participants also 
organized meetings outside of the structured process and facilitated them themselves. After 
each meeting minutes were circulated among participants and uploaded on-line in order to 
make the information available to the interested public. The facilitation has not always been 
an easy task: especially in the later meetings, conflicting views, opinions and interests became 
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quite clear. The task of guaranteeing neutrality, transparency and process fairness has 
therefore been difficult on some occasions (a quite common problem in participatory 
processes, see also Krütli et al. 2010). For a description of the process, see Scolobig et al. 
(2011). The discussions during the meetings were recorded, transcribed (in Italian)  and key 
contents were then summarized (in English) (see also Scolobig et al. 2011). Table 3 
summarises the key phases of the participatory process.  
Table 3 Key phases of the participatory process 
 
At the first meeting participants voiced their opinions and perspectives about the landslide 
problem (its causes, scope and seriousness) and its solution. Table 4 provides an overview of 
the problem, as voiced by the participants, including factors contributing to landslide risk in 
the community (e.g., industrial activities on the slopes), the deficit in risk awareness and 
communication (e.g. inadequacies in the emergency warning system), problems of risk zoning 
(including the conflict with economic development) and institutional deficits (e.g., the 
fragmentation of responsible authorities). A variety of solutions were also voiced, including 
passive measures (usually structural) that intercept the run-out when a landslide occurs, and 
active measures to improve the slope stability. In addition, participants suggested policy 
interventions to reduce landslide risk exposure, including land-use legislation and regulations, 
risk mapping, and even re-locating homes and other structures from high-risk areas. Particular 
attention was given to warning systems (which require monitoring technology) and 
evacuation plans. (A more detailed description of the problems and solutions listed in Table 4 







Table 4 Views of participants on the landslide risk problem and its solution 





• inadequate monitoring and control of the territory 
• unsustainable forest management and agricultural practices 
• industrial activities and man made interventions 
• uncontrolled urban development 





• low risk awareness and knowledge on the side of the residents 
• lack of information provided by the local authorities about risk areas 
• inadequate attention given to warning communication 
 
Risk zoning • disagreement with or lack of understanding of risk zoning criteria 
• trade off between high safety standards vs. economic development: landslide risk 
zoning hinders the economic and agricultural development of Monte Albino 
• risk maps proved to be unreliable after the 2005 event 
Institutional 
issues 
• fragmentation of competences and responsibilities among the different authorities 
dealing with risk mitigation 
• political instability as a barrier for effective decision making  
 
Solutions for risk mitigation 
 
• investment in structural (passive and active) and non structural measures 
• “soft” risk mitigation measures based mainly on natural engineering 
• upslope structural risk mitigation 
• mix of active and passive measures 
• relocation 
• elimination of the quarry 
• improvement of the emergency plan 
• re-activation of the mitigation works built at the time of the Bourbons 




• territorial survey presidium (i.e. experts dealing with risk management issues) 
• cost-benefit analysis of the possible measures to be adopted 
 
As with the preparatory interviews, the same three distinct and, to a considerable extent, 
mutually irreducible perspectives are clearly evident in Table 4, with each specific concern 
being associated with one or the other of the discourses (e.g. soft mitigation measures based 
mainly on natural engineering reflects the “careful stewardship of the mountain” discourse). 
In other words, this table provides us with a sort of content analysis of the contested terrain, 
the preservation of which, as we have argued, is crucial if we are to find our way to a 
compromise: a clumsy solution. And this contested terrain was then the basis for the next 
meeting: the meeting that brought together the public and the technical experts. The various 
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items in this Table 4, of course, are specific to Nocera Inferiore (and some of them to 
landslide risk more generally) but, we would contend, a table of this general form should be a 
key component in the design of any participatory process. 
For the second meeting, landslide experts at Salerno University prepared three different risk 
mitigation packages (options), each roughly consistent with one of the three perspectives on 
the landslide policy solutions that were voiced at the first meeting (as well as being revealed 
in earlier investigations). The co-production of these options is described in detail in 
Linnerooth-Bayer, et al. (this volume). They were arrived at through dialogues between the 
participants, with their “lay” knowledge of landslide risk, and the university staff, with their 
“expert” knowledge: in technical terms, their knowledge of the rainfall-induced mass 
movements (debris flows and debris avalanches) (Hungr et al. 2001) and mass transport 
phenomena (hyper-concentrated flows) (Cascini et al. this volume; Costa 1988; Coussot and 
Meunier 1996). Building on this knowledge, and on the participant perspectives, the 
following three packages of mitigation packages were constructed. Each, as well as being 
tailored to one of the perceptions, respected the legal requirement to reduce risk to the 
inhabitants in a cost-effective way, and each was consistent with the budget constraint of €7 
million (Cascini et al. this volume; Narasimhan et al. this volume). We will provide just 
thumbnail sketches here, the packages being set out in considerable detail in Linnerooth-
Bayer et al. (this volume). 
Safety First. A number of the participants viewed public safety as the first priority of any risk 
mitigation strategy, and felt that this would be best achieved with a prudent use of active 
measures (such as cleaning drains and properly managing the forests) and passive measures 
(such as decanting structures and storage basins). Consistent with this perspective, the Salerno 
experts constructed a mixed package consisting mainly of anchored sheet pilings (active) 
across the slopes, as well as passive storage basins at the toe of the catchments. These 
measures were designed to protect against hyper-concentrated flows triggered by rainfalls 
having a return period of 200 years (Cascini et al. 2013). In addition, as with the other 
packages, an improved warning system and a core of experts monitoring the site (along with a 
territorial survey) would complement the structural engineering investments. 
Careful Stewardship of the Mountain. Other participants put the emphasis on sustainable 
development and on the ecologically-informed maintenance of the mountain. To these 
participants, the underlying causes of landslide risk are largely those anthropogenic activities 
that have destroyed the ecosystem and degraded the mountains. Risk mitigation should 
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respect nature and follow sustainable principles, and these are inconsistent with, for example, 
massive concrete passive measures. The Salerno experts therefore constructed a risk 
mitigation package that emphasized active control measures (such as erosion control across 
the rills, water tanks in the piedmont urbanized area, and the planting of oak trees at the toe of 
the Mount Albino slopes). In addition, a part of the €7 million would be invested in improving 
the warning system and instituting a territorial survey. 
Rational Choice. According to the view of a small number of participants, the risk mitigation 
issue should be framed as a rational choice, taking account of the costs and benefits of the 
different mitigation measures, and also of other possible uses of public funds. Because 
structural protection measures are costly, and landslides infrequent, relocation could be the 
most cost-effective option and should be carefully considered. The Salerno experts duly 
designed an option that included the relocation of the most vulnerable homes, together with 
other, mainly active, measures that they considered to demonstrate a high benefit/cost ratio 
(for a full cost-benefit analysis of mitigation measures, see Narasimhan et al. this volume). 
 
Trade-offs, of course, were not entirely absent from the other two mitigation packages; how 
could they have been, given that each of them, like it or not, had to comply with the €7 
million fixed sum! But, while trade-offs are the essence of the Rational Choice perspective, 
they are something that is, as it were, external to the considerations that loom large in the 
other two. In consequence, trade-offs, as we go from one perspective to another, do not 
conform to a “single metric”: the costs and benefits of the same measures are shaped very 
differently. The costs of re-location in the Rational Choice option, for instance, are much 
lower than in the other two (which, in turn differ from one another), where they are variously 
seen as social, cultural and environmental, not just economic.  
A related, and crucially important, finding from this second meeting was that, when asked to 
choose the perspective with which they most closely identified, the participants reported no 
difficulty in settling on just one, together with its associated mitigation package. They also 
confirmed that the three narratives represented the full range of relevant public perspectives5.  
                                                
5 This can be explained by: i) the initial selection process aimed at selecting participants with different views and 
perspectives; ii) the fact that the discourses were constructed based on the information collected through the 
document analysis, interviews and the first meeting ; iii) the reinforcement in the informal meetings outside the 
formal process meetings; iv) the fact that, from the beginning, the participants knew that the mitigation packages 




In other words, no-one found him/herself torn this way or that, and no-one felt him/herself to 
have been missed out. So this provides empirical confirmation of the theory-based claim that 
the three narratives constitute a “proper typology”: a typology, that is, in which the categories 
are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (once we have allowed for the fatalist 
perspective, that is). This finding, moreover, undermines the criticism that has frequently been 
levelled at the theory of plural rationality by those who see themselves as post-essentialists (or 
post-modernists) and who claim that it cannot possibly capture the full richness of the 
empirically observable variety (e.g. Renn 1992). This criticism, along with others (some 
mutually contradictory) that have been levelled at the theory, are assembled, and largely 
refuted, in 6 and Mars (2008). The way was then clear for the third meeting. 
At the third meeting participants divided into three working groups of “like-minded” persons, 
made up of those preferring each of the three narratives and their associated mitigation 
packages. Those few participants who chose the third package later showed a preference for a 
mix of packages 2 and 3. At first sight, aggregating similar persons appears to contradict the 
purpose of the participatory process, which is to reach compromise among dissenting 
perspectives on a common policy path.  
To facilitate discussion, participants were provided with the following materials: a stylized 
description of the discourses behind the packages, a visual representation/plan of the 
mitigation packages, and a comparison of these packages on the basis of criteria identified 
during the previous meeting. Table 5  provides a synthesis of the commonly voiced opinions 
and priorities that were debated in each working group. 
 
Table 5 Commonly voiced opinions and priorities 
Working 
groups 






(Only few) passive control works 
Control works upstream rather than 
downstream 
Relocation of some houses, if it is a 
feasible and cost effective 
Budget constraints need to be taken into 
account for decisions about investment in 
passive vs. active works 
 
Active control works on the most 
endangered slopes 
Improvement of the warning system 
Improved mountain maintenance with a 
special focus on limiting illegal buildings 
Construction of few passive control works, 








Equity in risk distribution, i.e., assuring the 
same safety standard for each slope 
Sustainable development for the entire area 
Forestation (chestnuts) 
 
Stabilization of the open slopes 
Erosion control works along the hill slopes 
Forestation in the mountain area 
compatible with trees plantation to stabilise 




package 2) Emphasis on active measures using natural 
engineering techniques 
Construction of few water tanks 
Maintenance or river channels and concrete 
on river beds essential 
the soil and risk reduction on the open 
slopes 
Explore building water tanks upslope to 
avoid expropriation of private 
houses/properties 





packages 2 & 3) 
 
Warning communication and training for 
locals 
Need to better understand which open 
slopes pose the highest risk 
 
 
Warning and evacuation plan 
Forest assessment plan 
Forest and river basin cleaning 
Active mitigation measures  
Relocation 
Tree barriers 
Natural park and forest maintenance 
 
The picture that emerged from the working groups revealed a striking accord among the 
participants, insofar as the positions were not strongly polarized. Most participants agreed that 
active measures should be prioritized over passive ones, that an integrated system of 
monitoring and a territorial survey were needed, and that an improved warning system was 
essential. This relative lack of polarization, we should note, is in marked contrast to the initial 
elegant solution, back in 2008, that was so resoundingly rejected by the local authorities and 
the residents of Nocera Inferiore. So the participation process, even by this stage, had 
evidently moved things on in a constructive manner. Still, there remained many differences: 
on which slopes, for instance, should the (limited) passive mitigation structures be built? And 
which homes, if any, should be re-located? And can the small retention basins be built in non-
visible areas? It was these, along with other related and still contested issues, that were 
addressed in the fourth meeting. 
To prepare for the fourth meeting, and to give the participants a concrete package to debate, 
the Salerno experts drafted a proposal for a compromise mitigation package that combined 
elements of all three packages. The proposal was built on the areas of agreement, while, at the 
same time, striving to steer an even-handed path through the areas of disagreement. It 
included: 
• an integrated system of monitoring; 
• stabilization of the open slopes with naturalistic engineering works; 
• relocation of a maximum of four households at the toe of the open slopes; 
• a storage basin at the mouth of each catchment; 
• erosion control works along the rills using material provided by the forest; and 
• improvement of the warning system and institution of a territorial survey. 
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The compromise proposal was intensely debated, and an extra (fifth) meeting was scheduled 
by the participants to continue the debate. Two issues, in particular, were strongly contested. 
The first concerned the structural measures, the specific locations of which (unlike with the 
earlier technical options) were indicated in the proposed compromise package. Some of those, 
it turned out, were to be sited on private properties in the piedmont area, and this caused 
dismay among those affected (the properties typically comprising a house and some 
surrounding land). The unsightly structures, they felt, would lower their property values, on 
top of which some of their land would be expropriated by the state. In consequence, self-
interest (the so-called “NIMBY syndrome”: Not In My Back Yard) tended to over-ride these 
participants’ perspectives (see, for example, Cialdini 2000; Conzin et al. 2011; West and 
Bergstrom 2011). 
The second concern similarly arose from hitherto unspecified measures – in this case, the re-
location of four homes in the highest risk areas – being clearly indicated. Again, there was 
resistance to what was seen as the imposition of an unfair burden, the state being entitled to 
compulsorily purchase the properties without the inclusion of any element of compensation. 
Despite these two “bones of contention” the discussions did eventually move towards a 
clumsy solution: a clumsy solution, moreover, that was largely based on the compromise 
package provided by the Salerno experts. The six storage basins, however, continued to be 
resisted by those participants who owned properties that would be expropriated or otherwise 
impacted, and this is something that has still to be resolved. In addition to what had been 
proposed by the experts, the participants recommended the implementation of a “forest 
assessment plan” (so as to guarantee what they saw to be the sustainable management of the 
forest; an initiative that saw professional foresters joining the geo-morphologists in the expert 
ranks). They also called for the organization of simulation exercises and other initiatives (so 
as to increase residents’ awareness of risk and to improve their knowledge of emergency 
plans). And the re-location of the four (at a maximum) homes was rejected, with the 
participants recommending that the funds allocated for that purpose be used instead for the 
improvement of the warning system. 
Admittedly, after all these meetings, this is still not a 100% agreed solution, but clumsy 
certainly. And incomparably more acceptable and effective (by all the sets of criteria inherent 
in the three narratives) than the elegant (and one-way, top-down) solution that was proposed, 




The local authorities reacted very positively to the presentation of the research results. 
However at the time of this writing we can still not say the “final word” about the 
implementation of the proposed clumsy solution. One of the most critical problems has been 
the transferring of the allocated funding for risk mitigation. On 16.4.2015 (with the decree n. 
214), the first tranche of the funding for risk mitigation has been finally transferred to the 
municipality of Nocera Inferiore (http://www.agro24.it/nocera-inferiore-montalbino-
sbloccati-i-finanziamenti/). Yet, there is still some way to go before the finalization of the risk 
mitigation measures on the Monte Albino slope.  
 
6 Discussion and concluding remarks 
The analytical-deliberative process in Nocera Inferiore proved to be an important innovation 
in many ways. As a first landslide participatory process, it demonstrated the feasibility and 
value of involving citizens along with experts in an issue that was characterized by complex 
technical, economic and social considerations. It also demonstrated the feasibility of 
participation in an unstable and changing institutional environment, and showed that citizens 
with diverse backgrounds, interests and worldviews can engage constructively in a 
participatory, and expert-informed, process for the purpose of providing insights to the public 
authorities responsible for landslide mitigation. It enabled and facilitated, not only a two-way 
learning process, but also network building, improved understanding of landslide risk issues, 
and concrete actions to mitigate the risk. The process proved important, not only for providing 
public policy input but also for raising awareness among those who directly participated and 
among those who (since it is not feasible to involve everyone) were on the outside of the 
formal process. And, most tellingly of all, it broke the existing, and years-long, deadlock. 
The participants provided feedback through a questionnaire that was administered at the final 
participatory meeting. It showed (in line with Toad of Toad Hall) that few participants 
significantly changed their preferences during the process, and mainly those not living in the 
Monte Albino piedmont area. Indeed most participants, and particularly property owners in 
the high-risk areas, became more entrenched as the process proceeded. This is mostly due to 
the progressive realization that their own properties would have been affected by the 
implementation of the compromise solution.  Not surprisingly, their worldviews were 
reinforced in support of and justification for their perceived interests. Notwithstanding the 
particularly difficult issues of relocation and compensation, the participants reached a 
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compromise on recommendations for active and passive mitigation measures, for a warning 
system, and for a territorial survey. And, of course, they also, in the process, increased that 
fatalism-lessening pre-requisite for democratic governance6: their social capital (as famously 
demonstrated, in Italy, by Robert Putnam, 1993. 
In sum, the results of the participatory process demonstrated that it is feasible to organize an 
expert-informed participatory process that respects and builds on the conflicting perspectives 
of citizens. Starting with a very broad indication of divergent views the range of policy 
options was extensively deliberated through the participatory process, which, thanks to its 
explicit legitimation of the contested terrain, was able to progressively converge on a clumsy 
(and expert-guided) solution, clumsiness by design, in other words7.  
There was thus a process of reasoning and argumentation, which, however, did not lead to a 
general consensus on the problem itself. Participants, rather, stuck to (indeed, refined and 
narrowed) their deeply-held beliefs and views and, at the same time, moved towards a 
compromise. Experts, moreover, could constructively contribute to this compromise by 
providing inputs that respected the divergent and plural perspectives. The public officials, 
who had hitherto had to resort to the “one-way model”, confirmed that this “two-way model” 
has certainly helped in mitigating the landslide risk in Nocera Inferiore. And, perhaps more 
importantly, it has established a democratic process of public participation that can be 
extended to landslide risk (and other natural hazards) facing other communities in Italy and 
elsewhere. 
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